Paper short abstract:

This paper examines how British immigration judges assess evidence in order to try and predict the future occurrence of torture. The central argument of this paper is that through risk assessments, the absolute prohibition on torture is translated into the uncertainties of judicial attempts to predict the future.

Paper long abstract:

Human rights practices look to the future as much as the past. The principle of non-refoulement, of not returning people to places where they may face torture or other forms of ill-treatment, is but one example example. Yet, human rights projects are in a bind, as they are also part of a wider ''modernist project'' that eschews eschatology in favour of a sense of time without specific meaning, direction, or end point. In this process, the future seems dangerously opaque and inscrutable. The task of prediction is therefore inherently fallible. This paper examines how British immigration judges assess evidence presented in the course of claims made under Article 3 of the ECHR, in order to try and predict the future occurrence of torture. In particular, it examines how the category of risk is used to try to bring the future within view. The central argument of this paper is that through risk assessments, the absolute prohibition on torture is translated into the uncertainties of judicial attempts to predict the future. A right that supposedly has no exceptions or limitations becomes shot through with caveats and ambiguities once it is projected forward in time.