Paper short abstract:

Etude ethnographique, dans des lieux touristiques parisiens, du "jeu" du bonneteau où un manipulateur et des comparses cherchent à abuser un joueur naïf. Analyse de ces situations où les bonneteurs et le naïf sont confrontés à des incertitudes et des inquiétudes bien différentes.

Paper long abstract:

Au bonneteau, un contrat ludique semble s'engager entre le manipulateur et le naïf. Si Candide devine où se trouve la carte marquée, il doublera sa mise, sinon il la perdra. La simplicité apparente du mouvement donné aux trois cartes contrebalance le montant élevé du pari. Il s'agit pour le bonneteur, mais aussi pour ses comparses répartis dans le public, de rassurer le joueur potentiel, de faire taire en lui l'inquiétude que devrait soulever la perspective de pouvoir gagner si facilement de l'argent dans un lieu ouvert à tous les vents. A cette fin, la petite équipe de filous déroule une véritable scène de théâtre où chacun joue son rôle. Mais c'est un théâtre risqué. Aussi, à la moindre inquiétude d'un contrôle policier, l'estrade de carton est démontée et la compagnie dispersée. Mais que l'alerte se révèle fausse et la compagnie se recompose aussitôt pour reprendre tranquillement sa pièce. Tôt ou tard, un pigeon finira bien par se faire prendre dans les filets de cette fiction, mais il faudra peut-être alors réagir promptement à sa transformation en ours furibond de s'être ainsi fait duper.

L'analyse de ces situations où deux catégories d'acteurs (le bonneteur et ses comparses / le naïf) sont confrontés à des incertitudes et des inquiétudes bien différentes sera basée sur l'observation de lieux touristiques parisiens.

Paper short abstract:

The paper shows the cultural context of cheating by analyzing the way Polish farmers count and use mathematics to serve their own goals. It calls into question the legitimacy of calling some actions “cheating”, as this estimation shows only the cultural background of the evaluator.

Paper long abstract:

The aim of the paper is to show how the idea of what is "cheating" and what is not depends on the cultural context in which the act of cheating takes place. On the basis of data from the fieldwork conducted among Polish farmers (2005-2008) I will argue that local morality and system of norms significantly influence the way people "cheat" and - mainly - what is seen as cheating and what is not. I will show both: cheating as seen from outside (which might not be considered cheating from inside) and as seen from inside (which might be not considered cheating from outside). In empirical part of the paper I will focus on counting and the ways farmers use mathematics to serve their own goals. Cheating through using numbers and mathematics is not only a farmers' strategy, it is observed also in public discourse, in politicians statements etc. (in that case usually referred to as "manipulating" rather than "cheating"). I will try to answer the question whether using "alternative" mathematics can be treated as cheating, or rather just as culturally embedded action. I will also refer to other situations and actions, such as: benefitting from EU subsidies for farmers, merchandising farm products such as pigs or vegetables, exploiting social ties.

I will analyze reasons why some acts (by strangers judged as cheating) are not seen as cheating at all, while other - though seen as cheating, are not disapproved by local community members and finally - why some are condemned as more that cheating.

Paper short abstract:

This presentation is based on extensive materials produced by learned societies, scientific journals and individual researchers and addresses three key issues on the subject of gaming in scientific publishing: the problem of originality, the problem of authorship, the problem of citation uses.

Paper long abstract:

Different forms of gaming practices in scientific publishing have gradually spread, mainly because of evaluation methods applied to researchers and institutions. They have become so common they have led to shared denominations: "salami slicing" for cutting results in smallest publishable units, "gift, ghost or guest authorship" to pin the presence or question the surprising lack of certain authors, "self-promotion" through citation of their previous work for researchers and of their previous published articles for journals. On the background of routinized gaming, affairs and scandals regularly arise, thus creating a double transformation: first, they lead to the qualification of some of its practices as cheating or scientific fraud, second, they are used as motives for the creation of new procedures to reduce potential gaming.

This presentation is based on extensive materials produced by learned societies, scientific journals and individual researchers, mainly in biomedical sciences. It addresses three key issues on the subject of gaming in scientific publishing: the problem of originality, the problem of authorship, the problem of citation uses. It shows how, through borderline cases, gaming practices can be labelled as unproblematic, even strengthening publishing standards by their ironic or demonstrative effect, while others are excluded as being unethical or even deeply menacing scientific integrity.

Paper short abstract:

Young migrants from urban Eritrea and Ethiopia soon realise that the outside world does not keep what it seemed to promise. Lacking economic capital and valid documents they can rarely rely on formal bureaucratic processes when encountering embassies, borders, immigration departments or refugee agencies. Cheating may help, however.

Paper long abstract:

Young migrants from urban Eritrea and Ethiopia soon realise that the outside world does not keep what it seemed to promise. Lacking economic capital and valid documents they can rarely rely on formal bureaucratic processes when encountering embassies, borders, immigration departments or refugee agencies.

So honesty is a 'psychological privilege' they cannot afford, as Michael Jackson puts it (2006). Cheating in one's refugee biography, bribing a policeman or establishing and exploiting personal ties to official staff in embassies and NGOs may help, however. In order to advance this cultural competence and praxis can and has to be learned in the migrants' dispersed, but well-interconnected milieu. Here perceptions, trajectories and evaluations are broadly shared and debated, while most recent tricks and ways out are carefully protected and imparted only after one's own next steps seem secure. Informal and fraudulent approaches are pursued even if formal processes (visa, asylum etc.) seem more promising and permanent from the ethnographer's point of view. Informality has become a dominant mode of action. Migration's need to advance as well as the experience of social exclusion, exploitation and human rights' hubris are seen as a valid legitimation.

This paper wants to contribute to the theoretical discussion on informality as a habitualised mode of action, a specific culture and a constitution of self and the world. Its empirical examples have been collected in the ongoing research project "Dynamic worlds of imagination - learning processes, knowledge and communication among young urban migrants from Eritrea and Ethiopia" within the Bavarian research network "migration and knowledge" (ForMig).

Paper short abstract:

In this paper, taking into account ethnographic research conducted in border areas and institutions of law enforcement in Mexico and Europe, we critically review the concept of institutional corruption in understanding the phenomena that cheating in the interstices of the legal institutional system

Paper long abstract:

It is well known in many countries the existence of social practices by certain groups that contradict the foundations of the democratic nation state ruled by law. It is also frequently recognized these practices against citizens' rights are exercised by their own representatives and state officials responsible for ensuring compliance. Such is the case of Mexico, which in recent years have exacerbated the traditional problems of institutional corruption in the current context of the war against organized crime. However, the problems caused by the failure of institutional legality also extend to countries that are supposedly more under the rule of law and institutional control. In this paper, taking into account different ethnographic research conducted in border areas between Spain and France and between Mexico and Central America, and institutions of law enforcement in Mexico, we critically review the concept of institutional corruption in understanding the phenomena that cheating in the interstices of the legal institutional system. But these processes should not be conceived as epiphenomena, but as processes validated socially and morally entitled to become the structuring of social compliance. These corrupt practices can be understood as special adaptations of the rules of the state in contexts where they are represented as positive in moral horizons limited to local agreements, regardless of universal ethical values

Paper short abstract:

Coca growers in Bolivia need to negotiate constantly the legal and illegal aspects of the coca leaf, and engage in unofficial economies and politics. I argue that by doing so, they create their own morality, which is based on their idea of citizenship.

Paper long abstract:

Coca growers in Bolivia occupy a particular position within the national landscape, as they embody the contrast of legality and illegality inherent to the coca leaf. In addition, the coca leaf is often associated with contrasting notions such as indigeneity, national identity, and drug trafficking. I suggest that coca growers negotiate these contrasting associations when engaging in illegal economies and politics, and thereby create their own morality. This in turn is closely related to their idea of citizenship and is based on their sense of belonging to the nation-state: in their perspective, by virtue of being citizens, they have the right to earn a good amount of money. The only way to achieve this aim is thought to be by "cheating": doing businesses which could be characterised as lying between the illegal and unofficial, such as selling coca in unofficial places, engaging in clientelism and corruption - the latter two both conceptualised as an inherent part of politics. These activities are not perceived to be illegitimate, but to a certain extent rather a citizenship right. In order to participate in these activities, however, it is necessary to acquire a specific knowledge of the social context and to develop the ability to engage in it, which both contribute to a person's status. A person needs to know the hidden rules of the game, and only as such is perceived to be effective when engaging in politics and illegal economies. "Cheating" and moralising the illegal, therefore challenges the liberal understanding of citizenship.

Paper short abstract:

Informal purchases of work is often seen as detrimental to Swedish society yet commonly practiced. This paper untangles how buyers make sense of these exchanges in terms of how causes rationalize reasons while they with their own interests in mind simultaneously articulate a view on the common good.

Paper long abstract:

Svart arbete, informal purchases of work, is a widely debated societal phenomenon in Sweden. It is often seen as detrimental to contemporary welfare society, eroding taxpaying morals, fair competition and solidarity with fellow citizens. Acknowledged as wrong, it is in many instances also an acceptable and commonplace exchange practice. These purchases thus illustrate inherent tensions in the contemporary society.

Social phenomena that are taken for granted are intriguing (cf. Herzfeld 2005) and even more so if they are illegal, yet made licit. In these informants view, cheapness and simplicity were at the forefront of an individual economic reasoning. Comments such as 'it is such a small amount' or 'everybody else buys svart' pointed in other directions, to a negligible causality of these actions impact on society. A third set of explanations such as 'it is a kind of tax refund' justified an (unbalanced) economic relation with the state. Finally, expressions such as 'it's normal', 'it has always existed', and 'society would not function without it' entailed habitual and historical reasoning.

This paper untangles how purchasers' make sense of these exchanges in terms of how causes rationalize reasons (cf. Davidson 1963), but also how they justify their actions as individual actors with their own interests in mind can articulate an opinion on the common good (Boltanski & Thévénot 2006).

Paper short abstract:

In this paper, I show how acts of forgery, concealment and manipulation are understood in terms of resistance and control. I thus suggest that cheating is a form of agency through which people understand and navigate through their social world.

Paper long abstract:

State Bureaucracies have long been established as important sites, where the state comes to be understood through apparently mundane administrative practices. Furthering this approach, I ask how these understandings are forged, negotiated and contested through bureaucratic encounters.

A prominent example of active resistance can be found in acts of forgery, concealment and manipulation. As I encountered during my fieldwork in an Israeli state bureaucracy, "cheating the system" is a common practice, which is used not only to gain personal benefits, but also to accomplish a sense of control over what was perceived to be an unjust and overly rigid organization, and in extension, of what was thought of as an excluding and unaccommodating nation-state.

However, these acts of resistance proved to be a source of disappointment for the clients who pursued them. Time and time again, employees of this bureaucracy not only blatantly ignored these attempts, but even went as far as to furnish them. Paradoxically, while clients thought of their cheating as justly resisting the state's inflexibility, they were simultaneously outraged by the flexibility shown towards them, as it crippled their own agency and denied them their sense of victory, even though they had received the benefits they were not legally entitled to.

Thus, I will suggest that cheating is not merely a means for the acquisition of financial or symbolic capital, but that it is also a form of agency through which people understand and navigate through their social world.

Paper short abstract:

Evenki hunter-gatherers manage to resist the attempts of the State representatives to control and appropriate their nephrite business through maintaining unaccountable character of actions. The methods by which this in-transparency is attained correlate with egalitarian features of their culture.

Paper long abstract:

Anthropological researches frequently show how diversely the relationships to the State develop in frames of various cultures. These observations contradict the ideal premises of modern national states, notably unification and accountability (and controllability) of elements of social life of its citizens.

This paper focuses on the case of indigenous business enterprise, which was established by a group of Evenki of East Siberia and on attempts of State representatives to control it in order to obtain taxes and bribes. Evenki have been resisting these efforts for more than 10 years by generating unaccountability of their actions and reports filled with what one can call information noise, which are inappropriate for the reconstruction of the way the business is operating. The main cause of the success of this enterprise is the ability of its members simultaneously be in constant contact with local and central authorities but at the same time organize their business in such a way, that practically nobody (even the heads of it) can not present accountable and complete description of how it works. To a stranger's eye this business could look like a chaotic and unpredictable mass of occasions with unclear results, but such an impression is the best strategy to hide the business outcomes and profits both from the State, other rivals and clients. This anarchic business management, based on the egalitarian principles of hunter-gatherers social organization, found a remarkable niche in the global market trade between China and Russia.

The research is based on several extended fieldworks.

Paper short abstract:

Since the privatization of retail commerce in 1989, many Romanians have started buying consumer goods without paying on the spot. Particularly in rural areas, the practice is so familiar that people who pay cash for consumer goods are treated with suspicion. The paper discusses indebtedness in retail settings, specifically their deceptive side.

Paper long abstract:

The paper focuses on the unfolding of social relations of debt and duty in Romanian retail settings. Since the privatization of retail commerce in 1989, large numbers of people have started buying consumer goods without paying on the spot; this occurs in the absence of any legal provisions. They refer to this practice using the vocabulary of "debt" (datorie): "selling on debt" and "buying on debt." Debt relations are marked by the absence of interest, security, witnesses, formal agreements, evident means of sanctioning defaulters, as well as an elastic duration of repayment. The contrast to formal bank transactions - credit and debit relations - is striking. This paper refers to the deceptive side of indebtedness and its implications with respect to local notions of person and morality. I address the following questions: How is it that what counts for some Romanian analysts as a "credit transaction" is achieved and recognized as a "debt/duty relation" by participants in local settings? What kinds of conversions between debt issues and duty issues are achieved in practice? How does one know whom to trust and whom not? How does one get to be sure somebody will not resort to deceit under any circumstances? How does one start to "feel" she or he is deceived? How do some people manage to repeatedly deceive others, with no apparent consequences? Or, more intriguingly, how do people find it impossible to disentangle themselves from debt and duty relations, even if they realize they are being deceived?