Paper short abstract:

Building on work published in my recent Japanese Confucianism (Cambridge, 2016), and adding further research data (both historical, and fieldwork based), this presentation uses the sociology of Confucianism in Japan to answer the question: is Confucianism religion?

Paper long abstract:

Debates over whether Confucianism is religion have raged since the sixteenth century. The question of Confucianism’s “religiosity” (or lack thereof) played a key role in: 1) wider sixteenth to eighteenth century global political battles of the Jesuits; 2) the nineteenth century modernist characterization of “Oriental” society as static, backward, and timeless; 3) twentieth century liberal and socialist modernizing iconoclasm; and 4) modern conservative cultural essentialism. The relationship between negative or positive characterizations of Confucianism, and its definition alternatively as religion or philosophy, has continued as a major point of tension in discussions on the politics of the tradition across East Asia for five centuries, climaxing in the modern period. Confucian revivalists in contemporary China, the Communist Party organs which regulate religion there, and Japanese philosophy, politics and religion players and academics, have all argued in these terms. This presentation uses the sociology of Confucianism in Japan to engage this longer durée history and politics asking the simple question: is Confucianism religion?

Building on work published in my recent Japanese Confucianism: A Cultural History, and adding data from further research (both historical, and my own field work on contemporary practice in both Japan and Taiwan), this paper emphasizes the plurality of manifestations of Confucianism in all periods of Japanese history, yet asserts a number of commonalities across period: notably the importance of aspects we would today label using the world ‘religion’, and a common thread of local actors treating Confucianism in the same ways as other traditions commonly held to be religions. I argue that, in almost all present and historical manifestations of Confucianism in Japan, it was/is: 1) socially positioned in parallel alongside other traditions universally understood as religions (notably Buddhism, Daoism, Shinto and Christianity); 2) politically controlled, regulated and exploited ‘as a religion’ through exactly the same instruments as other religions; 3) centrally reliant upon core religious practices and methodologies, even when primarily active in other fields like literature, politics, ideas or medicine. I thereby conclude that Confucianism in Japan should be regarded as religion.

Paper short abstract:

Confucianism as jukyô can be seen as an invention in modern Japan, for which few research on Confucianism have been made. I will focus on sinologists like Uno Tetsuto or intellectuals like Nakae Chômin to explain this process in tension between shûkyô and tetsugaku, which are also modern creations.

Paper long abstract:

The debate to decide if Confucianism is a religion or a philosophy is still existing in China, as points out Anna Sun recently in Confucianism as a world religion (2013). In Japan, Confucianism is often associated with Edo period, in which he played an important role in the intellectual history. Despite the pioneer work of Warren Smith (1959), renewed by Kojima Tsuyoshi (2006), myself (2014) and Kiri Paramore (2016), very few researches addressed the modern period to study Japanese Confucianism and little have been made concerning the debate mentioned above. Yet the collective work leaded by Benjamin Elman, Herman Ooms and John Duncan (Rethinking Confucianism, 2002) have traced a new way, based on a deconstructive approach, that can be applied to Japan, exactly like Kuroda Toshio did for example in the case of Shintô. Same approach can be found for the notion of religion itself in the works of scholars such like Hoshino Seiji (2012), however without specific attention to Confucianism.

Since in Meiji era notions of shûkyô and tetsugaku were created to translate "religion" and "philosophy", a way to contribute to the debate on Confucianism can be done through historical approach. But, instead of bringing directly an answer, we would like to question the debate itself by showing that the so-called Confucianism, jukyô, have been created itself as category just as much as shûkyô and tetsugaku. Then, as we will show, according to the personal goal of the author, jukyô have been defined as religion as well as philosophy, in a tension between Japanese identity and "Eastern" (tôyô) identity. We will focus on the specific cases of sinologists like Uno Tetsuto, Yamada Jun or Yamaguchi Satsujô, and also intellectuals like Nakae Chômin, Takase Takejirô or Yasuoka Masahiro to clarify the dynamic process of invention of Confucianism in modern Japan.

Paper short abstract:

The founding of Heian jingū is often explained in simple terms; it was established for the 1100th anniversary of the move to Heian and was dedicated to the city's founder. A closer look reveals a more complex narrative that illustrates the fits and starts of State Shinto in the early Meiji period.

Paper long abstract:

The founding of Heian jingū in 1895 is usually explained in very simple terms; it was established to commemorate the 1100th anniversary of the move to the Heian capital and was, therefore, dedicated to the city's founder, Emperor Kanmu (r.781-806). A closer look at the shrine's founding story reveals a much more complex narrative that illustrates the fits and starts of State Shinto in the first decades of the Meiji period.

As such, this paper touches not only on doctrinal issues such as the deification of past emperors, but also on material aspects such as the Meiji government's creation of a blueprint for newly erected shrines. Moreover, tracing Heian jingū's founding story might help explain how a major imperial shrine (kanpei taisha) can be so replete with Chinese symbolism and why in later years at least one of its designers expressed great disappointment at the end result.

The paper will conclude by arguing that exactly these China-derived elements—and their related beliefs and practices—currently form the core of Heian jingū's self-portrayal and play a crucial role in its continued popularity.