Paper short abstract:

This paper discusses the interests and strategies of local politicians in the design and delivery of public goods to urban dwellers. These strategies are seen as specific responses to contest and shape the hegemonic structure of their municipal government which is dominated by the central regime.

Paper long abstract:

The municipal government of Kumasi, like numerous others in Ghana, has autonomous powers to make laws and reform their structures to regulate local economic and development activities. Municipal political reforms seek to improve their local policy-making processes, governance and delivery of public goods to the city's dwellers. Yet, the institutional reforms have also spurred strategic reactions from local actors who exploit institutional ambiguities to pursue their local political interests. This paper, drawing on empirical data and the institutional concept of 'entrepreneurs', shows how actors with local political interests exploit legislative ambiguities to establish themselves as institutional entrepreneurs emboldened to contest the hegemonic structure of the local state which is manipulated by the central state. However, these manipulations by central state politicians, which are reactions to processes from the international development system, make the municipal government's promise of reforms that deliver efficient public policy in the city particularly difficult. Management of public goods and services becomes a contested field for bureaucrats and political actors all vying for their interests in the city's political landscape. This renders the city government less capable of delivering the expectations of constituents because the institutional changes appear mainly as 'business as usual' with new rules.