Moira V. Faul
Head of Research
Public-Private Partnerships Research Centre
Université de Genève

Global Partnerships for Sustainable Development?

Comparing the Cases of Climate Change, Education and Heath

Paper accepted for presentation in the panel
'Multi-stakeholder Partnerships and Power'
Development Studies Association (DSA) Conference
Oxford, UK, 14-16 September 2016.

DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION

Abstract: Multi-stakeholder partnerships that bring together representatives from public, private and third sectors are often presented as an essential ingredient for the fair implementation of Agenda 2030, mirroring the participatory spirit in which these goals were created. How partnerships are established and enacted will impact more or less positively on sustainable development for all. Many studies of 'partnership' investigate the formal rules that include new development actors and assume the mitigation of existing power inequalities. Yet, conventional partnerships research tends to elide the specifics of the politics of, and operation of power in, partnerships. What happens in practice? This paper examines and compares the configurations of power and practices of partnership in global partnerships in climate change, education and health. This analysis extends existing accounts of partnerships as essentially mitigating asymmetries of power, showing rather that in practice partnerships can deepen existing power hierarchies in the international system. Thus, this analysis contributes to debates on agency and power within the partnership networks that are central to the implementation of the SDGs and Agenda 2030.

Table of Contents

Tables and Figures

1. Global Financing Partnerships and the SDGS

The head of the IMF described 2015 as a 'once-in-a-generation opportunity for global development' (Lagarde, 2015). A series of global summits hammered out a number of agreements, including in development financing (July 2015), sustainable development goals (September 2015) and climate change (December 2015). Previously, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) urged governments to do more of the same; that is to bring about a quantitative shift in social policy provision. In contrast, the SDGs demand that all economic and social development partners work towards qualitatively different goals in a qualitatively different way. First, the goals propose a qualitatively different rebalancing of economic, environmental and social inequalities and recognition of the systemic links among the 17 goals. Second, diverse development 'partners' are urged to work together in a qualitatively different way, so that a 'revitalised Global Partnership ... bringing together Governments, civil society, the private sector, the United Nations system and other actors and mobilizing all available resources' can achieve sustainable development for all (UN: General Assembly, 2015, p28 §60).

Divisions between public / private and for-profit / not-for-profit have structured economic, environmental and social thinking, policy and practice for over a century. Recently, organisations in these categories have been overtly challenged to work together in policy calls and funding support for public-private partnerships (PPPs) for sustainable development. The prevailing PPP narrative is that intractable sustainable development problems that have not been solved by a single-sector approach are to be solved by establishing a multistakeholder partnership. Multistakeholder partnering requires individuals to work across multiple organisational forms, rationales, logics, cultures, and identities in order to achieve a beneficial impact in areas such as health, education or climate change mitigation and adaptation. This paper systematically considers the extent to which key assumptions in the partnership narrative are implemented in three global funding partnerships, in order to examine the operation of power in relations among partnership Board members as well as among funds and their recipients.

Additionally, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda calls for increased public and private financing for the implementation of the SDGs to be made available, whether from domestic resource mobilization (DRM) or international development cooperation (foreign direct investment (FDI), aid, loans) or trade (UN, 2015). International aid could be mobilsied through bilateral South-South or South-North cooperation and triangular (South-South-North) cooperation, and also (as examined in this paper) global funding partnerships. Such financing partnerships are lauded as "effective instruments for mobilizing human and financial resources, expertise, technology and knowledge", with examples given of global financing partnerships in climate change, health and education (UN, 2015, pp. 35-36, §76, 77, 78), the cases selected for examination in this paper.

Why partnership research?

Changing practices of cooperation and collaboration at global, regional, national and local levels require the consideration of partnership as a new and different phenomenon. The increasing prioritisation of multi-sectoral partnerships in policy discourse and also in practice mean they can no longer be disregarded as marginal phenomena (Börzel & Risse, 2005). While many analyses exist of the contributions and roles of states, IGOs, businesses and civil society organisations in development, few studies consider the ways in which actors from these different sectors are formally brought together in mutistakeholder partnerships to agree and disburse funding priorities for a development problem.

Thus, existing analyses cannot illuminate the ways in which organisational actors from within these different sectors interact (more or less formally) with each other, instituting new multi-sectoral global networked structures through these relationships (Reinicke, 1999; Stone, 2008). Since relations among heterogeneous actors are at the heart of partnership, it is not possible to develop a convincing account of partnerships and development without understanding these relationships and networks. Therefore, this paper analyses the relationships and strategies employed by the totality of actors – from many different organisations and sectors – as they interact in multisectoral global funding partnerships.

Additionally, partnerships tend to be viewed uncritically, such that Slaughter (2004, p. 167) assumes that networks possess 'general virtues of speed, flexibility, inclusiveness, ability to cut across different jurisdictions, and sustained focus on the specific set of problems'. Furthermore, a technical narrative of more equal reallocation of benefit and risk among private and public sectors dominates (Forrer, Kee, Newcomer, & Boyer, 2010; World Bank Institute, 2012). Yet there is mounting empirical evidence that partnerships' internal dynamics and external impacts may contradict these assumptions (Faul, 2014, 2015; Jomo, Chowdhury, Sharma, & Platz, 2016; Koppenjan & Enserink, 2009; Mazzucato, 2013; Pishchikova, 2014). It is impossible to explain these partnership processes and effects without considering questions of power.

2. Partnership in the SDGs

Partnerships for the SDGs are assumed to be 'built upon principles and values, a shared vision, and shared goals that place people and the planet at the centre, are needed at the global, regional, national and local level.' (UN: United Nations, 2015, 28):

§17.16 Enhance the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development, complemented by multi-stakeholder partnerships that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, technology and financial resources, to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals in all countries, in particular developing countries

§17.17 Encourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships

Rhetorically this ambition may be justified. Yet it is not rigorous to assume that development goals are shared among diverse partners, much less the principles and values underpinning them. In network terms 'each node [or partner] enters the network [or partnership] with a distinct set of goals. Only a portion of these goal sets overlap.' (O'Toole & Meier, 2004, p. 684). Equally, different principles and values motivate the reward structures of the diverse sectors to be mobilised in multi-sectoral partnerships (Chowdhury, 2012; Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). How these competing priorities are negotiated and to what end matters since they affect the outcomes and impacts sought by the partnerships. Therefore, an empirical analysis of the extent to which partnering practices may adhere to partnership principles is required.

Global funds as partnering activities in complex landscapes

Global funding partnerships are one innovation among a constellation of recent trends that appear to move away from conventional bilateral project and programme aid towards new varieties of financing mechanisms and modalities that may be multilateral and/or bilateral, as well as public and/or private (Heimans, 2002).

Figure 1: Forms of PPP for sustainable development:



Source: Schmidt-Traub & Sachs (2015)

Yet these categories are not mutually exclusive. In addition to carrying out PPP activity, these global funds also stimulate other forms of PPP activity. Taking the Schmidt-Traub & Sachs (2015) typology as a starting point, it is possible to discern that all of these funds can be used to support the private provision of a public contract. Research and development consortia are only supported by the GCF and GAVI. The GCF is the only fund that can be used to finance pro-sustainable development taxes and subsidies (for example for renewable energy). GAVI was developed to aggregate diffuse demand for vaccines and to enable differential pricing for medication for higher and lower income countries. The extent to which these aims are fulfilled is debated.

Figure 2: How global funds also stimulate other forms of PPP activity



Furthermore, the sectors that are addressed in the Sustainable Development Goals are, by necessity, the areas of human activity in which core challenges remain unresolved. Partnerships are trumpeted as the key solution in issues where sector-specific activity (usually public sector activity) has been seen to fail (Kolk, Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008; McQuaid, 2000; Vries, 2013), such that “a revitalized Global Partnership … will facilitate an intensive global engagement in support of implementation of all the Goals and targets, bringing together Governments, the private sector, civil society, the United Nations system and other actors and mobilizing all available resources.” (UN: General Assembly, 2015, 10, §39). However, in trumpeting the aspirations of partnership, challenges around the practicalities of partnering, and the expression of power through partnering structures and strategies, are side-lined.

Narratives of global financing partnerships

Thus, the partnership narrative runs that global pooled funds, or financing partnerships, improve coordination among diverse donors and other stakeholders in order to more effectively mobilise additional public and private resources (whether international or domestic) in order to enhance sustainable development impacts (Figure 3). Reproducing private sector efficiency is assumed to improve allocation of these resources and the implementation of programmes for enhanced impact for sustainable development.

Figure 3: Assumptions in the pooled fund narrative

This paper is structured around investigating the extent to which the internal coordination and external allocations of mobilised funds in three case study partnerships live up to these claims. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate enhanced impact: the focus here in on comparing the arrangements for coordination and allocations. Thus the following analysis focuses on the extent to which the three global financing partnerships examined fulfil the assumptions described in Figure 3.

This paper considers the extent to which these narratives play out in the three global financing partnerships under consideration, and the power dynamics they reveal. Working backwards through the assumptions in the global fund narrative (Figure 3), the paper examines how these partnerships are designed to:

- Increase financing available for the issue?
- Allocate funds efficiently:
    i. to whom?
    ii. through which structures?
- Be inclusive and equitable
    i. with whom?
    ii. through which structures?

By answering these questions, this paper reveals the diverse inclusions and exclusions, yet similarly inappropriate formal structures and power dynamics at play in all three cases.

3. How are these partnerships designed to increase available financing?

All three of these global funds hold public pledging conferences, where they encourage governments and private sector actors (usually Foundations and think tanks) to pledge to increase the amount of money they spend in these issue areas either in their own work, in their own country or as development assistance.

With regards to development assistance, global financing partnerships are one innovation among many in the aid landscape. Other novelties include the proliferation of new development actors (Ben-Artzi, 2016; Colclough, King, & McGrath, 2010; Mawdsley, 2012) and development financing modalities (Bräutigam, 2010; Eyben, 2006; Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, 2014). Additionally, many bilateral donors are now seen to draw explicit interlinkages between aid and national self interest, where this would have been decried under previous official aid narratives of recipient country ownership and partnership (OECD, 2005, 2011). Examples include using development aid to further foreign policy goals (Fuchs, Dreher, Hodler, Parks, & Raschky, 2015; OECD-DAC, 2016; Sumner & Mallett, 2012; Villanger, 2011), and the securitization of development aid (Buzan & Wæver, 2009; Lazell, 2015; Overton & Murray, 2016), alongside proposals to provide aid directly to the private sector or civil society (Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing, 2014; ODI & UNDP, 2011).

These innovations could indicate that previous aid narratives of developing country ownership (OECD, 2005) or partnership (OECD, 2011; UN: General Assembly, 2015; UN: United Nations, 2015) are losing ground to a more explicit prioritisation of donorship. However there are differences under the surface. For example, while the UK DFID aid budget grows as the economy does, a larger proportion has been allocated to security concerns that previously would have been attributed to a Ministry of Defence budget (UK-DfID, 2011). At a minimum, an additional 8% was allocated directly to tackling instability and fragility and more was spent on education, health and other social services in countries that are considered important to UK security (UK Ministry of Defence, 2010). In the recent migration "crisis", the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have all used funds from their regular development assistance budget to spend on hosting additional refugees, thus reducing the amount that can be spent on other areas of concern (SEEK Development, 2016). Furthermore, these innovative funding partnerships can divert funding from other, more established, agencies. For example, at the same time as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is receiving record amounts of financing from donor governments, the World Health Organization (WHO) is facing a shortfall of 25% in its core programme budget (The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2016; WHO: World Health Organization, 2015). Thus, in this increasingly complex aid landscape, the already complex and contradictory incentives, discourses and practices of aid donors and recipients can appear further distorted.

The overwhelming majority of funding made available to these financing partnerships comes from state donors (Figure 4). As of July 2016, the Green Climate Fund had raised US$10.3bn in pledges from 43 state governments (GCF, 2016). Equally, in education, donor states pledged US$2.1 billion to the GPE for the period 2015-18. In addition, two private sector Foundations contribute a total of US$23 m to the GPE, or 1% of the total. In addition, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) pledged up to US$400m in co-financing in an innovative financing mechanism for loan-buy down arrangements (GPE, 2014). The Gates Foundation donates 16% of GAVI funds: US$1.553bn of the total US$9.6bn. It appears, however, that the Gates

Foundation bases its contribution on the financing gap that remains after other donors have pledged. Only US$0.022bn is donated by other private sources, which accounts for just 0.23% of total GAVI funds.

Figure 4: Who contributes to these global pooled funds?



The assumption that private funds will be mobilised seems unproven in these three cases. Small contributions come from Foundations rather than the profit-making core of the private sector. The exception is the Gates Foundation, which contributes heavily to GAVI, which has recently bolstered its efforts to mobilise private sector investment (GAVI, 2015, p. 8-9). The large contribution from the Gates Foundation is only to be expected since this partnership was established by the Gates Foundation rather than being a state-led initiative in the same way as the GPE and GCF. Thus, the vast majority of finance in these global partnerships comes from states. Yet, states are not the only recipients of financing from these global pooled funds, as I now discuss.

4. To whom are these partnerships designed to allocate funds?

In all three cases, public actors are recipients of funds from these global financing partnerships. Non-state actors a differently included in the three partnerships examined.

In addition, the majority of GPE funds (95.6%) are for education sector implementation grants and it had a small scheme available to civil society (0.95%). The private sector cannot (yet) directly access these funds. However, indirectly, the education sector programme implementation grants can be used to pay private sector providers of educational products and services. Furthermore, the World Bank's (2011) education strategy prioritises the private provision of education services in a manner unprecedented in global education policy. This strategy also establishes structures through which private sector corporations may eventually become direct recipients of development aid.

The majority of total GAVI disbursements (93%) go to national ministries, with 81% being spent on vaccine-related costs and 12% being spent on health system strengthening, with the remaining 7% is used for vaccines and operations investment cases (GAVI, 2016b). Civil society receives less than 0.3% of GAVI's total funding, for their role in disbursing vaccines (either directly or through ministerial spending on health systems strengthening) and also to improve their engagement in planning and policy (GAVI has delegated Catholic Relief Services (CRS) to coordinate this aspect of funding) (GAVI, 203). However, in its overwhelming focus on disbursing funds to purchase vaccines (in comparison to public health systems), GAVI funds the pharmaceutical industry and research, which is mainly a for-profit private sector venture.

In the case of vaccine prices, GAVI's last evaluation concluded that "it has been well documented that GAVI's initial assumption that market forces would lead to a reduction in vaccine prices has not occurred." (CEPA LLP & Applied Strategies, 2010, 15). This has contributed negatively to GAVI's financial challenges and also to

GAVI-funded countries' ability to become increasingly independent of GAVI funding. Thus, the financing partnership has enriched the private sector while perpetuating financial challenges for itself and financing and health challenges for its recipients.

Private sector companies can receive funds directly from GCF as accredited entities, or from accredited entities to provide technical products or services and also for investments (GCF Board: Green Climate Fund, 2016). Thus, different partnerships have established different solutions to the same question as to who can be recipient of funds (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Who receives funds from the partnerships examined?



The GPE has the most conservative solution, with the vast majority of funding going to recipient states, and a small proportion being received by civil society. The for-profit private sector may receive funds indirectly if a government decides to contract-out the provision of these public goods, but this is not critical to the GPE's business model. While GAVI funds a very similar set of recipients, for-profit recipients again are mainly funded indirectly. However, this is critical to business model since the funds serve to increase the provision of industrially produced vaccines. In contrast, the GCF is the least conservative, since donor and recipient states, multilaterals, civil society, foundations and for-profit actors may all apply to be accrediting agencies to manage GCF funds and also to receive such funds.

Thus, who is allowed to be a recipient varies across the three cases. States receive the majority of funds, and civil society and for-profit private sector providers and investors may also benefit. This direct funding of the private sector can be interpreted as encouraging the private sector to contribute to sustainable development by appealing to its profit motive to influence its decision making towards more sustainable and developmental business models and practices, and also by bringing their voices into a dialogue about sub-national and national development priorities. However, direct funding of the for-profit private sector is also seen as a potential risk, in that a more complex mix of voices and interests requires more coordination and can skew priorities and funded activities away from social and environmental development towards economic inequalities (Chang, 2010; ODI & UNDP, 2011)

Furthermore, profit-making private sector companies are not donors here into the pooled funds, while Foundations make almost insignificant contributions. In the cases of the GPE and GAVI, there is an apparent ‘over-representation’ of the private sector on Boards in comparison with its modest financial contributions to the partnerships and the rewards they have the potential to reap. It would appear, therefore, that rather than increasing the private funding contributed to these pooled funds, instead the private sector is being subsidised by public monies made available through these global financing partnerships. Therefore, the official narrative that these partnerships will enable public sector finance to unlock additional private sector finance appears to be turned on its head. Instead, through these partnerships, public funds are used to turn a profit.

The operation of power therefore appears in the assumptions of the current narrative of private sector efficiency and additional money donated from the private sector, both of which are disproved so far. It is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the sustainable development impacts of these global funds, however, the positive outcomes appear to be accruing to the private sector.

The following section considers the operation of power in the different ways in which the relations between global funding partnerships and their recipients may structured.

5. How are these partnerships designed to allocate funds efficiently?

The global pooled funds examined in this paper raise, manage and disburse billions of US dollars in financing for sustainable development. Their Boards are tasked with providing – or deciding who else may provide – oversight, coordination, programming decisions, implementation, and execution (ODI & UNDP, 2011). Each of these tasks may be carried out at international or national levels. In all cases examined, the different architectures established reveal different expectations in the oversight, implementation and execution functions that external partners (recipients) may carry out (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Comparison of oversight, implementation and execution functions



Thus, in the case of the Global Partnership for Education (GPE), recipient countries may only access funding where a donor country approves their national education plan. The Charter for the Global Partnership for Education describes that the local donor group 'monitors and promotes progress toward better harmonization and alignment of both financial and technical support' (GPE: Global Partnership for Education 2011: 6 §3.4.5.). Monitoring, alignment and harmonisation are central to the Paris Declaration principles of ownership (OECD, 2005). However, since donors must approve the policy agenda put forward, this donor approval mechanism could also be constructed as withholding ownership of national policy agendas and perpetuating practices of "donorship" (Faul, 2014).

The GAVI Alliance follows the second configuration, in which it is also a privilege of a partnership Board or Committee to evaluate and approve developing country national plans or systems as fit for funding. However, the Board delegates implementation as well as execution authority to the recipient country. Thus GAVI directly funding Implementing Partners (the World Health Organisation and UNICEF) who work with national Ministries of Health to implement this plan and decide which national and sub-national, private or public sector agencies to approve for funding.

Finally, and most recently, more direct access to global pooled financing mechanisms has been successfully advocated and adopted by the Green Climate Fund (GCF). In this model, elements of international oversight remain, but only as an adjunct to devolved oversight. National and local oversight, implementation and execution are central. The Green Climate Fund (GCF), as the most recently established fund, is the closest to this delegated model. The GCF accredits agencies that then receive and disburse funds to other public and private executing entities.

Thus, ways of structuring of external relationships of the partnerships examined are significantly different. The GPE centralises oversight, implementation and execution, while the GCF delegates all of these functions to an accredited entity, and GAVI works through multilateral Implementation Partners who work with national Ministries of Health.

These three global funding partnerships all prioritise efficiency in resource allocation, yet seek to achieve this through significantly different procedures. The centralised model of the GPE privileges Board members and donors. GAVI appears to devolve more responsibility, yet the strictures imposed on what GAVI funding may be used for privileges the pharmaceutical industry. GCF's direct access model was designed to support national ownership and oversight of funding. This accreditation of national entities has now also been extended to multilateral and private sector organisations.

6. How are these partnerships designed to be inclusive?

Judged in terms of ensuring buy-in and commitment of partners to a relevant and effective partnership, the necessity of diverse stakeholder representation would appear to be almost self-evident, and is framed as such in official documents (UN: General Assembly, 2015). Yet different partnerships interpret the need for the inclusion of diverse stakeholders in different ways. The global financing partnerships examined in this paper are all governed by Boards of Directors who make key decisions on who may be eligible to sit on the Board, who may be eligible to receive funds and through which mechanisms.

The Green Climate Fund (GCF) only recognises state representatives, such that: "The Board will have 24 members, composed of an equal number of members from developing and developed country Parties." (GCF, 2015: 4 §9). The Global Partnership for Education extends its membership from donor and recipient states (6 seats each) to include multilateral agencies (3 seats), private sector/foundations (1 seat) and civil society (3 seats) partners. The GAVI Alliance is the most inclusive of all: in addition to 5 seats each for developed and developing country governments, there are 9 seats for independent individuals; 3 seats for multilaterals (nominated as WHO, UNICEF, and World Bank); 2 seats for the vaccine industry (one each for representatives from developed and developing countries); and 1 each for civil society organisations, research institutes, the Gates Foundation, and the GAVI CEO. Thus, the for-profit aspect of the private sector is represented, as are individuals who provide expertise in "investment, auditing and fundraising" (GAVI, 2016), research institutes, and the head of GAVI. Therefore, GAVI is most inclusive while membership of the GCF is exclusively reserved for states (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Comparison of stakeholder representation on GCF, GPE and GAVI Boards



Participation by different sectors may be limited for several reasons. First, partnership architects can seek to restrict the size and diversity of Boards, in order to prioritise efficient decisionmaking over inclusion (Bezanson & Isenman, 2012). Additionally, the demands of diverse funding bodies may need to be accommodated in the Board composition (Buse & Harmer, 2007; Faul, 2015). PPPs are commonly found in sectors that conventionally fall under government authority (Stadtler, 2012), therefore state representation may be greater to ensure that this authority can be maintained, or lesser which has the effect of diluting this authority. Evidence-based policy is an important element in all of the partnerships examined, however, only the GAVI Alliance includes experts (individuals and institutes) in their Board. Whatever the reasons for these different inclusions and exclusions, the Boards of the three case study partnerships diverge significantly (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Differently diverse Boards of financing partnership cases



Equally, there are differences beneath the surface of equal participation of partners in all funds. In the GCF, "developed" countries may select their own participants with no further guidance, yet "Representation from developing country Parties will include representatives of relevant United Nations regional groupings and representatives from small island developing States (SIDS) and least developed countries (LDCs)." (GCF, 2015: 4 §9). Within categories of membership (or sectors) in the GPE, different groups or organisations are granted more seats or more permanent membership. Thus, of the three multilateral agency seats, one is reserved for multilateral donors, the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), while a plethora of UN agencies fight over the remaining two seats, and civil society representation is defined by the partnership not the constituency. Equally, in GAVI, while constituency representatives are rotated out every two years, certain members have the privilege of holding permanent seats on the Board: UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Thus, each of these funds have different rules defining who is – and is not – considered a potentially valid partner, and therefore global decision maker. Different global financing partnerships include or exclude representatives from different sectors, and also different numbers of representatives from different sectors. They have three factors in common, however. First, the differing membership structures of the partnerships are all constructed as being based on the same principles of equality and inclusion, even when these principles are enacted in very different ways. Secondly, within each sector represented in partnerships, different rules are applied to different representatives, such that certain sectors may select their own representatives whereas certain sectors' representation is defined by other partners. Finally, funders are in the driving seat, deciding the number and types of representation for all partners.

Thus, all three aspects of these global financing partnerships examined thus far show diversity and divergence in who is considered a partner and recipient, and how the relationships with recipients are structured. In contrast, the design of all these partnerships mandate the same formal relational structures inside their Boards: equal and shared governance, an assumption which I now demonstrate to be deeply problematic.

7. How are these partnerships designed to be equitable

Partnership structures need to be designed - and implemented as designed - to effectively achieve their stated functions. In all three cases, the Board is designed to share governance functions equally among the diverse partners.

Thus equal and shared governance is preferred in the design of the Boards of global funding partnerships. However this may not be the most appropriate to the partnership's members and stated goals. Shared governance is a feature of self-organising networks, in which there is high trust among few participants who share similar goals. Shared Governance is only one of three different forms of networked governance identified by Provan & Kenis (2008), alongside Lead Organisation and Network Administrative Organisation (Table 1).

Table 1: Forms of networked governance

Structure ⟶ Strategies

Governance Forms	*Number of partners*	*Goal consensus at the outset*	*Structuring of ties*	*Need for partnership competencies*
Network Administrative Organisation	Moderate to many	Moderately high	Moderate, members monitor NAO	High
Lead Organisation	Moderate number	Moderately low	Low density, highly centralised	Moderate
Shared Governance	Few	High	High density	Low

Source: (Provan & Kenis, 2008)

Reading this table from left to right, all three partnerships investigated have more than the "few" partners that are typical of spontaneous Shared Governance networks. Yet these global funds are predicated on including diverse stakeholders from different sectors. Furthermore, while there may be consensus on top-level goals among partners, decision making authority and agenda-setting capacity is seen to be skewed in favour of certain partners rather than shared (see, for example, Faul (2014) on global education, and Shiffman (2014) on global health). The formally established structures of all three partnerships assume a high density of relationships among partners, which mirrors one aspect of a Shared Governance structure. Equally, there is less need for network-level competencies in Shared Governance networks that are more homogenous and small (unlike these heterogeneous and large partnership networks). Network-level competencies are those required to ensure that smooth functioning of a network - or networked partnership - in the absence of an organisational hierarchy. Thus, it would appear that shared governance remains an ideal to which these partnerships could aspire and work towards, rather than an assumption that automatically plays out in practice.

Is formal design implemented in informal practices?

Assumptions about the formal design of partnerships may not be borne out in reality. In addition, the informal relationships that partners choose to pursue may not live up to this ideal. For example, Faul (2015) demonstrates that a partnership may be designed with high-density, egalitarian relationships, and yet partners may informally structure themselves into lower density, unreciprocated - and therefore unequal - relationships.

Figure 9: Comparison of (a) formal and (b) informal partnership relationships



(a) Formal (b) Informal

Legend:

D	Donor countries	ML	Multilateral agencies
R	Recipients	CS	Civil society
		PS	Private sector/Foundations

In this case of a global education partnership, the structuring of informal relationships indicates that rather than being power-neutral, a hierarchy exists in this partnership in which certain actors are more central than others. These practices contrast with what are generally assumed to be legitimate and appropriate partnership practices. This informal relational structure has more similarities with the low density, highly centralised Lead Organisation structure in this model (in this case Lead Organisation role being shared between a multilateral and state donor agency). However, recognising this informal structure, or naming a lead organisation, could undermine the politics of partnership, and would be seen as no more than harking back to previous (unsuccessful) forms of governance.

Thus, the education case indicates the need to look beneath the surface of formal agreements to the soft underbelly of informal practices. Network analysis of relative power positions suggests that informal networking practices can undermine norms of partnership, indicating that partnerships may amplify rather than moderate existing power disparities. Data collection is about to begin for the GCF and GAVI to add to current understandings of the operation of power through the informal relationships in these global partnerships.

Therefore, global financing partnerships need to be careful in the management of design and behaviour challenges. First, the Shared Governance structure will not automatically deliver a superior partnership and partnership impacts. Secondly, partnering behaviours inside formally designed partnership structures affect the effectiveness of the governance and impacts of a partnership. Therefore, in addition to the challenges of the environment in which they are seeking to have an impact, these PPPs are also vulnerable to challenges inside the partnership. These challenges can spring from the different backgrounds of partners, which may give rise to different goals, interests, behaviours, and logics. Furthermore, PPPs are expected to balance inclusion and equity of diverse partners (social logic) against efficiency (market logic). PPPs therefore need to consider carefully partnering structures and strategies; and compare formal design with informal behaviours.

8. Conclusion

The three core assumptions about partnerships for the SDGS are that they increase the sustainable impact of development financing through:

a. Increasing the financing available
b. Improving the efficiency of the allocation of funds and the implementation of programmes and projects
c. Providing more inclusive and effective coordination

This conclusion considers each in turn to examine the extent to which these assumptions are borne out, and these narratives are enacted, in the partnerships examined, and what that might reveal about the exercise of power inside this partnership.

First, the assumption that multistakeholder partnerships increase the financing available for an issue is widespread. However, the partnerships examined all mobilized funds mainly from the public sector (governments) and some (comparatively little) additional financing from Foundations. Even donor agencies that do not contribute to the funds can maintain a decision-making position, such as the World Bank in the case of the GPE. Donors are the first to decide who may be included as a partner or recipient and under which conditions/rules. This power is then ceded to the Board (under conditions that donors have defined).

Secondly, it is critical to examine the implementation of the partnership narrative of inclusion: which actors and sectors are privileged by inclusion either inside the partnership as a Board member, or outside the partnership as a recipient. The three cases examined prioritized different partners differently both inside and outside.

Inside the partnership Boards, different partners are included in different ways. In contrast to its inclusive approach towards recipients, the GCF only allows states to sit on its Board. In contrast, the GPE Board also allows partners from multilateral agencies, civil society and Foundations. The GAVI Alliance is the most diverse, with representatives from all these categories plus for-profit private sector entities, research institutions and individuals. These individuals' expertise in fundraising is most prized. Looking under the surface of these inclusions, donors and the private sector (where present) hold the most autonomy to define their own representatives while recipient governments and civil society hold the least.

In the relations between the partnerships and recipients, The GCF has accredited entities to directly receive and disburse funds that are state-based, multilateral or from the private sector. In contrast, the GPE and GAVI provide funds mainly to governments, with a small amount set aside for Civil Society. In both the GPE and GAVI the state can then contract for-profit private sector contractors. Thus, despite not mobilizing significant private financing for the partnership, all three global financing partnerships examined enabled the private sector to generate additional profits from these funds whether directly (GCF) or indirectly (GAVI and GPE); as part of the Fund's business model (GCF and GAVI) or not (GPE). This also indicates the power of the second narrative among donors: efficient allocation and implementation may trump inclusion and equity concerns, and that private sector involvement is seen to be critical for both. In all cases, the perceived efficiency of the provider/recipient wins out against considerations of diversity and equality of treatment.

Finally, partnerships are assumed to provide more effective coordination through the design of governance structures. All three partnerships examined were designed with a shared governance model. However, this is the appropriate form for small and relatively homogenous partnership networks. Partnerships for the SDGs are deliberately heterogeneous, and the smallest of those examined (the GPE) had 19 members. Recognising this would allow the consideration of other governance models which could be more appropriate, and would also enable a more open discussion of the need for allocating resources (time and money) to developing partnering competencies and capacities rather than assuming they are not necessary.

Thus, all other aspects of the ways in which these financing partnerships organise themselves internally and externally differ significantly, yet they all share the same governance structure. This could be due to the prevailing narrative that coordination problems are solved by establishing a multistakeholder partnership, and that its design essentially modifies partners' goals and behaviours. However, diversity in partnerships carries its own challenges; and network competencies are critical to effective partnering in these contexts. Additionally, informal relationships matter in networked partnerships; they are central to both partnering behaviours and also to negotiating partnership goals. Furthermore, it is difficult to address issues of network competencies and relationships under the other core partnership narrative of efficiency. Building relationships among partners is a messy, iterative, time-intensive, complex and above all human activity: to be effective it is necessarily an inefficient activity. However, it is difficult for either of these issues to be addressed if the partnership narrative continues to be assumed to reflect reality, rather than an aspiration. Yet these issues must be resolved if more powerful partners are to counter claims of capture of these partnerships to further their own agenda rather than sustainable development impacts.

While global funds are touted as a solution to financing sustainable development, this paper reveals that there are many different configurations of global pooled funds, all of which operate in an increasingly complex funding and implementation contexts. Yet, these inequalities are not an essential feature of partnerships. Rather, they can be attributed to the assumption that engineered partnerships may follow the same governance structures as spontaneous networks, which is based on an optimistic underestimation of the complexity of partnering practices. This lack of recognition of the need for partnering knowledge and skills in turn leads to the insufficient allocation of resources to the process of partnering.

This paper has focused on the formal design and implementation of three global financing partnership cases. Future research is required that considers the implementation of this formal partnership design in practice. In the case of education (Figure 9), Faul (2015) argues that the informal relationships into which partners organise themselves at least reflect, if not reinforce asymmetries of power outside the partnership. Data collection and analysis will take place in 2016 and 2017 to enable the comparison of formal partnership design and informal partnering practices in the GCF and GAVI. Such research is necessary since current underestimations of the complexities of partnering practices can perpetuate, rather than undo or reverse, existing asymmetries of power, with potentially negative impacts on sustainable development for all. Equally, more research is required on the external impacts of these funding partnerships: on recipient-implemented outcomes, and most importantly on the sustainable development impacts they are assumed to achieve.

References

Ben-Artzi, R. (2016). *Regional Development Banks in Comparison*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bezanson, K. A., & Isenman, P. (2012). Governance of New Global Partnerships: Challenges, Weaknesses, and Lessons (Policy Paper No. 14). Washington D.C.

Bräutigam, D. (2010). China, Africa and the International Aid Architecture (No. 107). African Development Bank Working Paper Series. Tunis.

Buse, K., & Harmer, A. M. (2007). Seven Habits of Highly Effective Global Public-Private Health Partnerships: Practice and Potential. *Social Science and Medicine*, 64(2), 259–271.

Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2009). Macrosecuritisation and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitisation theory. *Review of International Studies*, 35(2), 253.

CEPA LLP, & Applied Strategies. (2010). GAVI: The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation Second Evaluation Report.

Chang, H.-J. (2010). Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History. *Journal of Institutional Economics*, 7(4), 473–498.

Colclough, C., King, K., & McGrath, S. (2010). The New Politics of Aid to Education—Rhetoric and Reality. *International Journal of Educational Developmen*t, 30, 451–452.

Eyben, R. (2006). The power of the gift and the new aid modalities. IDS Bulletin, 37(6), 88–98.

Faul, M. V. (2014). Future-perfect/Present-imperfect: contemporary constraints on the implementation of a post-2015 education agenda. *International Journal of Education and Development*, 39, 12–22.

Faul, M. V. (2015). Networks and Power: Why Networks are Hierarchical Not Flat and What Can Be Done About It. *Global Policy*, 7(2), 185–197.

Fuchs, A., Dreher, A., Hodler, R., Parks, B. C., & Raschky, P. (2015). Aid on Demand: African Leaders and the Geography of China's Foreign Assistance.

In Economic Development - Theory and Policy Annual Conference 2015. Munster: Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.

GAVI: The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation. (2013). GAVI Programmatic Support to Civil Society Organisations Implementation Framework.

GAVI: The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation. (2015). Report to the Board: Resource Mobilisation and Private Sector Partnerships. Retrieved April 19, 2016, from http://www.gavi.org/About/Governance/Gavi-Board/Minutes/2014/10-December/

GAVI: The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation. (2016a). Board Composition. Retrieved April 19, 2016, from http://www.gavi.org/about/governance/gavi-board/composition/

GAVI: The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation. (2016b). Commitments and Disbursements. Geneva: GAVI: Global Alliance for Vaccine Initiative. Retrieved April 19, 2016, from http://www.gavi.org/results/disbursements/

GCF: Green Climate Fund. (2015). Governing Instrument for the Green Climate Fund. Charter.

GCF: Green Climate Fund. (2016). Status of Pledges and Contributions made to the Green Climate Fund. Retrieved April 24, 2016, from http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24868/Status+of+Pledges+(2016.2.19).pdf/71e3e528-d170-4dfd-aab0-e4a6f00888b9

GCF Board: Green Climate Fund. (2016). GCF Accreditation assessment of Acumen and impact investment fund. Retrieved April 24, 2016, from http://www.greenclimate.fund/-/acumen-and-gcf-sign-agreement-to-implement-its-first-approved-project-proposal-bringing-household-solar-energy-to-east-africa?inheritRedirect=true&redirect=/home

GPE: Global Partnership for Education. (2014). Our Second Replenishment. Retrieved June 2, 2015, from https://www.globalpartnership.org/replenishment

Heimans, J. J. (2002). Multisectoral Global Funds as instruments for financing spending on global priorities. Un.org. JOUR. Retrieved August 23, 2016, from http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2002/esa02dp24.pdf

Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing. (2014). Report of the Intergovernmental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing to the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly. New York.

Jomo, K. S., Chowdhury, A., Sharma, K., & Platz, D. (2016). Public-Private Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development : Fit for purpose ? (ST/ESA/2016/DWP/148 No. 148). Retrieved August 23, 2016, http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2016/wp148_2016.pdf

Kolk, A., Tulder, R. Van, & Kostwinder, E. (2008). Business and partnerships for development. *European Management Journal*, 26(4), 262–273.

Koppenjan, J. F. M., & Enserink, B. (2009). Public-private partnerships in urban infrastructures: Reconciling private sector participation and sustainability. *Public Administration Review,* 69(2), 284–296.

Lagarde, C. (2015). Seizing a once-in-a-generation opportunity. Washington D.C. Retrieved April 2, 2015, from http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2015/070815.htm

Lazell, M. (2015). Liberalism(s) and the Critical Securitization of Development Debate. *Globalizations*, 7731(December), 1–16.

Mawdsley, E. (2012). *From Recipients to Donors: The Emerging Powers and the Changing Development Landscape*. London: Zed Books.

Mazzucato, M. (2013). *The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public Vs. Private Sector Myths*. London: Anthem Press.

McQuaid, R. W. (2000). The Theory of Partnerships - Why have Partnerships. In S. P. Osborne (Ed.), *Managing public-private partnerships for public services: an international perspective* (pp. 9–35). London: Routledge.

ODI: Overseas Development Institute, & UNDP: United Nations Development Programme. (2011). Direct Access to Climate Finance: Experiences and lessons learned.

OECD. (2005). The Paris Declaration. Paris.

OECD. (2011). Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation: Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. Paris: OECD.

OECD-DAC. (2016). ODA Reporting of in-Donor Country Refugee Costs. Retrieved July 3, 2016, from http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/refugee-costs-oda.htm

Overton, J., & Murray, W. E. (2016). Aid and the "Circle of Security." In *The Palgrave Handbook of International Development* (pp. 433–450). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Pishchikova, K. (2014). Greater Synergy and Improved Collaboration: Do Complex Partnerships Deliver on the Promise in Countries Emerging From Armed Conflict? *Voluntas*, 25(1), 2–27.

Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2008). Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 18(2), 229–252.

Schmidt-Traub, G., & Sachs, J. D. (2015). Financing Sustainable Development: Implementing the SDGs through Effective Investment Strategies and Partnerships. Retrieved October 2, 2015, from http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/150619-SDSN-Financing-Sustainable-Development-Paper-FINAL-02.pdf

SEEK Development. (2016). Understanding the implications of the refugees crisis on major European donors' development budgets. Retrieved August 16, 2016, from seekdevelopment.org

Shiffman, J. (2014). Knowledge, moral claims and the exercise of power in global health. *International Journal of Health Policy Managment*, 3(6), 297–299.

Stadtler, L. (2012). Designing public-private partnerships for development. *M@n@gement*, 15(1), 77–100.

Sumner, A., & Mallett, R. (2012). *The Future of Foreign Aid: Development Cooperation and the New Geography of Global Poverty*. London: Macmillan.

The Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria. (2016). Global Fund Welcomes U.S. Leadership in Global Health. Retrieved September 6, 2016, from http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/news/2016-08-31_Global_Fund_Welcomes_US_Leadership_in_Global_Health/

UK-DfID. (2011). Department for International Development Business Plan 2011-2015. London.

UK Ministry of Defence. (2010). Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review. Policy document, London, UK: TSO.

UN: General Assembly. (2015). Draft Resolution A/69/L.85: Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Retrieved September 24, 2015, from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/69/L.85&Lang=E

UN: United Nations. (2015). Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development.

Villanger, E. (2011). Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives. *Forum for Development Studies*, 34(2), 223–256.

Vries J., M. S. de and N. (2013). Public Sector Reform: An overview of recent literature and research on NPM and alternative paths. *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, 26(1), 4–16.

WHO: World Health Organization. (2015). Funding of WHO Programme Budget 2016-17. Geneva: WHO: World Health Organization. Retrieved September 2, 2016, from http://www.who.int/about/finances-accountability/funding/financing-dialogue/session1-funding-2016-17.pdf

World Bank. (2011). Learning for All: World Bank Education Strategy 2020. Strategy, Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications.