Paper long abstract:

In today's Kazakhstan, "shala-Qazaq" (half-way or partial Kazakh) is a derogatory term used in relation to ethnic Kazakhs, who have limited or no knowledge of Kazakh language (i.e. Russified Kazakhs). Shala-Qazaqs are allegedly alienated from genuine Kazakh culture and traditions. Ironically, just a century ago "shala-Qazaq" was already a well-known term with an almost opposite meaning. In most historical sources, this term occurs as "Chala-Qazaqs." It refers to an individual or community of people in the Kazakh Steppe, who had mixed ethnic origin (usually a Kazakh mother and a Sart or Tatar father), lived among Kazakhs, and adopted Kazakh culture (spoke Kazakh language and practiced Kazakh customs).

Chala-Qazaqs lived among Kazakhs, spoke the Kazakh language, and practiced Kazakh customs. Their exclusion from the patrilineal Kazakh kinship system was, probably, the only factor that prevented their acceptance as "fully" Kazakh. However, sources suggest that the Kazakh kinship system was not impermeable, and families of Chala-Qazaq origin could be integrated as a line of a Kazakh tribe and lose their "Chala" status. The Kazakhness of former Chala-Qazaqs was evinced by their incorporation into Kazakh shajarahs, tribal genealogies kept in oral and written forms. Hence, the "Chala" status could serve as a way of integrating individuals of mixed ethnic origin into the Kazakh ethnicity. It appears, however, that this process stopped in the 19th century, which, I will argue, was a result of the Russian expansion to its eastern domains, including the Kazakh Steppe.

Paper long abstract:

The Russian imperial policy in the Kazakh steppe led to a radical break-up of the traditional political system of the Kazakh society. Creation of new administrative units led to the creation of new local government institutions in the Kazakh steppe. These changes led to the transformation of the traditional structure and adaptation to new changes, particularly to the change in the role of the Kazakh elite from "aq suyek" to the one that demanded loyalty to the "Tsar and Fatherland". As Gulmira Sultangalieva wrote in her Officials of the Orenburg Department (2014), the Kazakh elite were incorporated into the imperial system and became managers within the Russian Empire. The main criteria for Kazakhs going into Russian state service were social origin, knowledge of Russian/Tatar languages, knowledge of "near-border" Russians, efficiency and zeal, respect and trust from the local population, and dedication to the Russian power.

This paper will consider the careers of the three representatives of the Kazakh political elite, whose slogan was: «Knowledge is a way of rescuing the nation». They are Jangir khan (the ruler of the Bukey Horde); Akhmet Janturin (Aga-sultan of the eastern part of the Orenburg region); Musa Chormanov (Aga Sultan of Bayan-awil outer okrug, Northern Kazakhstan). What unites these individuals is that they all were graduates of the Russian military educational institutions, knew several languages, had military ranks, worked within the Russian colonial institutions, and contributed to the development of enlightenment and culture in the Kazakh steppe.

For the Kazakh elite, education was an important tool of maintaining their influence on the local authorities in a new way. To achieve this goal, the Kazakh elite supported the development of the Russian-style education in the Kazakh steppe, financed the construction of new schools, allocated financial support for schools, teachers and medical personnel, financially supported Kazakh students studying in Russian higher educational institutions, created scholarships for the Kazakh youth, invited educated young people to serve in administrative institutions.

In addition to their official and administrative activities, Zhangir Khan, Ahmet Zhanturin and Musa Shormanova collected materials about Kazakh language, religion, literature, history, and traditions, wrote works about Kazakh folklore and ethnography, supported Russian scholars doing research in the Kazakh steppe, and participated in the exhibition presenting Kazakh culture, opened ethnographic and military museums and joined scientific organizations of the times such as the Russian Imperial Geographic society, Kazan University.

Paper long abstract:

This paper offers a comparison between Crimea and Kazan after the Great Reforms of the 1860s, focusing on state-society interaction. In particular, it looks at the situation of Muslims, comparing the position of Tatars in the two regions. Tatars formed the most sizable group of internal "others" in both territories, about 30 percent of the population in Kazan and over 40 percent in Crimea. Most of them were peasants, rather than merchants or intellectuals. The paper combines a "top-down" with a "bottom-up" perspective, exploring not only the ways in which Muslim Tatars were legally encoded and governed but also their everyday engagement with state institutions. In how far did the relationships that Volga and Crimean Tatars entertained with the imperial state differ, and what do these differences tell us about changing and diverging forms of imperial borderlands?

Both Crimea and Kazan constitute "intermediate terrains", former frontier zones with histories of independent social, economic, and political organization that, by the mid-nineteenth century, were largely treated as part of the imperial core. They differed from more peripheral territories that were annexed in the course of the nineteenth century and not fully integrated into the empire's civil-administrative structure. Like most parts of European Russia, intermediate terrains integrated minorities to a considerable degree, offering them privileges, legal opportunities, and civic participation. Yet, while addressing the ways in which Crimea and Kazan were similar, the paper pays particular attention to their differences. It touches on their dynamic, and diverging, role in the imperial imagination. It argues that while Kazan was increasingly past its prime, the southern peninsula began to thrive. With waves of European settlers and seasonal visitors arriving, and many Tatars leaving for the Ottoman Empire, migration came to shape life in Crimea much more than in the Volga region. The end of serfdom and the shortage of land also affected the two regions in very different ways. The institutions of the Russian state took on the role of overseeing transactions and settling disputes in Crimea; and since comparable institutions had already existed under Ottoman rule, these institutions were accepted to a greater degree than in Kazan, where violent confrontations remained common.

The paper draws on archival materials from Kazan, Simferopol (Crimea), and Odessa, on local publications, the memoirs of regional administrators, and on an examination of the local press.

Paper long abstract:

This paper focuses on the development of tea trade and the local tea-drinking culture in Turkestan after Russia's conquest. The ubiquitous teahouses were a distinctive cultural and social phenomenon in Turkestan, and the local tea-drinking practices reflect a fusion of Chinese, Russian, and Inner Asian cultures. At the same time, In the nineteenth century, the Central Asian tea market was a huge market within the Russian Empire. It involved complex trading routes and the competition between British and Russian Empires. Based on the primary sources, the Russian colonial rule had two major concerns regarding the tea trade: to replace British/Indian tea with Russian tea in the Central Asian market, and to integrate Turkestan more closely into the imperial economic system. This shows Russia's intention to turn Turkestan into a terminal, not a transit, of tea trade, which also implies the shifting position of Central Asia in the nineteenth century. Based on various travel accounts and published materials from Turkestanskii sbornik, this paper aims to show that the significance of the tea market and tea-drinking culture in Central Asia have been overlooked by previous studies. The Central Asian tea market evolved simultaneously along with the establishment of Russia's hegemony in the region.