Paper long abstract:

This paper presents analysis from field research on the precipitation of conflict in Darfur in 2002-03, and the influence of the IGAD peace process on the nature and timing of conflict. It critiques the approach of the international community to fostering peace in Sudan and concludes by reflecting on implications of the Darfur/IGAD interrelation on current peace-making and conflict dynamics in Sudan (in particular the DPA and the East).

International actors supporting the IGAD process adopted a north-south definition of the Sudan 'problem' and an exclusive approach to the negotiation, both for reasons of expediency and misdiagnosis. This weakness was exacerbated by a failure to adapt the 'sequenced' approach or to employ complementary mechanisms to mitigate unintended consequences of IGAD as politics and power relations shifted and stirred other crises. These consequences were predictable and probable on a proper analysis of the interlocking nature of grievance and conflict in Sudan.

Beyond the historic and incremental build-up of crisis within Darfur, research findings indicate external interconnections and linkages played a significant role in determining the timing, nature and direction of the conflict. The crisis in the Islamist project following the al-Turabi and Bashir split contributed significantly to increased political violence in Darfur and the emergence of the DLF (later SLA) and the JEM. The SLA/M and JEM in turn looked to developments in IGAD as both inspiration for the possible benefits of armed struggle, as well as a danger should they not claim a share.

The SPLA/M (above a longstanding interest in mobilising Darfuri rebellion) saw opportunity to re-assert its New Sudan position (undermined in Machakos) as it negotiated in IGAD, and thus it contributed in material ways to the organisation and mobilisation of the SLA/M. The disproportionately heavy military response of the Sudanese Government also linked back to the IGAD context, as it was both incited to prevent further erosion of its power and shielded from sanction owing to its ability to leverage the IGAD process. At the same time, the Darfur conflict was aggravated by downplaying, deferral and de-linking by international actors concerned not to derail IGAD negotiations. All this may be understood as the problematic political economy of peace-making in Sudan.