Paper long abstract:

In July 2004 elections for municipal councils took place in Niger. The number of councils was expanded, further enhancing the recent process of decentralisation. For the first time a quota system was legislated. This resulted in an average of two to four women being elected in each municipal council. Although the number might not seem significant, the fact that women at local level could publicly stand for a position signalled their access to local politics.

In the municipal councils researched, the representation of women councillors is 20%, twice the required quota. This suggests that women are not only chosen as 'tokens' because of the quota system - which is intriguing in a society where women as 'public' persons are perceived differently from men and where religious, cultural and economic conditions often reinforce unequal relations between men and women.

This paper analyses the experiences of the women elected in municipal councils by looking at the formal criteria and informal dynamics that influenced their election. The research demonstrates how the women utilised predominantly informal dynamics in their campaigns and exploited their access to the private domain of voters and their various networks as a major source for support.

The representation of women councillors in the five municipal councils confirms that within the decentralisation process women have better access to local politics. But the research also illustrates ambivalent attitudes towards women elected within their own political party and own communities.

Paper long abstract:

The 2003 decentralisation process in Benin places the newly elected councillors in the position of designing and implementing local development. In the absence of sufficient means from central government, the councillors are pushed to mobilise as much local resources as possible to finance the municipal development. Revenues from markets are important because they represent between 15 and 30% of the municipalities income.

The research is about the municipalities of Dogbo and Aplahoué in the South-West of Bénin. How is it possible that Dogbo improved its market income from 9 million Fcfa (656 Fcfa = 1€) in 2002 to 14 million in 2004 while Aplahoué could augment from 15 to 77 million Fcfa? Apparently, local authorities can and do make different choices when it comes to taxing. Otherwise, how can one understand that in two comparable markets the amount collected is so different?

An analysis based on survey data of a sample of taxpayers and tax collectors, completed with a study of qualitative data collected on the two local authorities, revealed two major conclusions:

- determination and leadership in identifying revenues sources, control and rigor in collecting taxes, concern for equity, a good organisation in the tax collection, added to a good level of motivation among tax collectors helps guarantee an effective tax mobilisation;

- ethnicity is a constraining force as some citizens claim tax exemption because they belong to a certain ethnic group. When the authorities have no clear answer, this reduces the effectiveness of tax collection and will reduce the amount collected.

Paper long abstract:

The election of municipal councils and mayors in April 2003 marked the start of decentralisation in Benin. The first year all councils prepared a development plan. To support this process, the government and the international community have put in place a range of capacity strengthening programmes. They promote social capital, leadership, and the use of participatory approaches to stimulate ownership. That is, ownership over the vision, strategy, programming, financing and implementation of local development. The present study tests the hypothesis that there is a correlation between these four factors and the performance in implementing the municipal plan.

The research covers 20 of Benin's 77 municipalities and is based on interviews with councillors, civil servants and active members of civil society. A model is developed in which three proxy indicators assess a municipality's performance: 1) realisation of the 2005 budget; 2) transparency about expenses and revenues; 3) a clear organisation of the implementation and monitoring of the plan. The model also includes proxy indicators for social capital, the quality of leadership, the level of participation and ownership of the municipal plan. The findings of the research do not confirm the correlation between performance on the one hand, and social capital, ownership, leadership and participation on the other. The impact of capacity strengthening programmes on the performance of municipalities can thus not (yet) be proven.

Paper long abstract:

In Burkina Faso basic health services are progressively being decentralised to municipalities after the local elections of the 23 of March 2006. However, contrary to expectations, decentralisation in many African countries has not lead to improvements in basic service delivery. This raises the question whether Burkina can fare better. This research identifies some of the conditions that could assist municipalities to build performing health services at local level. These conditions will not be easily met.

The research studied the operation of basic health services using the framework of accountability relationships developed by the World Bank. Within this framework the authors analysed the nature of the relationship between three key actors ('policy maker', 'service provider' and 'service users') in terms of its effect on service delivery. Taking into account the foreseen developments of the decentralisation process in Burkina Faso, combined with the experience of more 'advanced' sub Saharan countries, we assess the potential strengths and weaknesses of the organisation of basic health service. Finally, we present some arrangements to restore the disrupted mechanisms of accountability between the actors. These measurements build on opportunities which are today existent, although somewhat hidden.

On the one hand, decentralisation will lead to some obvious improvements like shortening the long (electoral) route of accountability and improving the checks & balances between policy maker and service provider. On the other hand, Burkina risks a system of unbalanced accountability, growing clientelism (informalization) and lack of redistribution of the earmarked national budget towards local administration. If no corrective arrangements are taken, the poorest patients risk to pay the price.

Research team:

Aline Congo

Karim Zone

Bertram van der Wal

Jean Marc Sika

SNV Advisors