Paper short abstract:

In this paper I examine ethical assumptions that connect empathy, intimacy and the good life, and ontological ones that connect intersubjectivity, imagination and socialisation. I examine both from the perspective of the experience and capabilities of people diagnosed on the autism spectrum.

Paper long abstract:

Empathy runs like a thread through the history of anthropology. Methodologically it has figured as a key aspect of participant observation, our royal road to the life-worlds of others. Ontologically it lies at the foundation of intersubjectivity and the social capacities of humans. In its contemporary turn it ties in with developmental concepts such as theory of mind and joint attention as a core conception of what it is to be human that attempts to bridge a phenomenology of the social world and cognitive psychology. And yet it remains a term that is used as if everybody already knew what it meant. In this paper I examine the implications of locating empathy at the heart of our conception of the human from the perspective of the experience, capabilities and developmental trajectories of people diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum. I draw on the preliminary results of a project on the life histories of adults diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome (now incorporated into the Autism Spectrum in the DSM-5), a range of autobiographies of people on the spectrum and the major themes of contemporary neurodiversity activism. In particular I consider what it would mean if we were to displace (1) intimacy from the centre of our conception of the good life and (2) intersubjective synchronisation with others as our basis for knowledge of the world.